Preparing for Virtue Epistemology

This evening there was discussion on virtue epistemology with Weilguny. Here is a remark concerning animal  knowledge and reflective knowledge. It seems that animal knowledge kind of sticks to local environment, where the tendency is goal oriented and atomistic. But some reflective knowledge of KKp brand is needed  to lead us to the real knowledge. One may ask what sort of reflective matter one means by this, and the answer may be something such as evidential consciousness. Now, animal K seems to be measured just by this kind of consciousness. But one would do better to distinguish qualitative phenomenology from reflective consciousness. And it seems that apt skills as the basis of epistemic virtues need exactly qualitative phenomenology. Apt skills as epistemic virtues are cognitive abilities, such as perception, attention, reasoning. They certainly seem to need qualitative phenomenology to get off the ground. The picture published here, of Howard Robinson August 2008, taken by David Chalmers, has nothing to do with all of this; it is just a trial to publish a photo. But in another sense the subject matter corresponds to Sosa's concern to distinguish dreaming beliefs from non-dreaming usual beliefs. In his view these differ from each other, as opposed to the prevalent received view in philosophy and literature. It is hard to see what underlines their difference though: just a feeling of incoherence? Two kinds of K need to be assessed from the angle of environments they involve. Reflective K involves transglobal environment of a narrow nature, whereas animal K involves external local environment. Safety concern should be measured along this angle.