Milan Italy November 2010 and dealing with Meinongian ontology

On Thursday November 11 I participate in a symposium dedicated to the Meinongian philosophy of oughts, with my and Vojko's paper Where Do Oughts Come From? The occasion at the Universita degli Studi di Milano, Facolta di Giurisprudenza, is presentation of Emanuele Marini's thesis on Uomo, dovere, etica nella filosofia di France Veber (1890-1975). [You can access this PhD text if you browse some Emanuele Marini related stuff in this blog.] Besides to Emanuele whose knowledge of Slovene language and Veber is excellent, there will be also Venanzio Raspa with his presentation of Meinongian Sollen. Everything will happen in Italian language. After that, I look forward to the Villa Borromeo Verdiglione lecture, before returning home and delivering Dejanskost pripovedi lecture on Monday November 15th at 11:20h room 434 Filozofska fakulteta Ljubljana. This will end a two weeks intensive Meinongian engagement that started with the visit of Seppo Sajama from Finland. (You may wonder what is cooking in the background in terms of further plans. Here is a preliminary announcement: detailed study and presentation of the forthcoming Epistemological Spectrum Henderson and Horgan book in preparation of the Bled May 30-June 3 conference, Brain in a Vat Phenomenology and much more.)
   By the way, I enjoyed my yesterday lecture on the Meinongian roots of analytic philosophy. My insight was that dealing with Meinong is at the very basis of analytic philosophy, the analysis of sentences being proposed in Russell paper On Denoting (1905) in order to supposedly get rid of Meinongian unreal objects. The adequacy surface structure of some sentences, such as The actual king of France is bald, Ponce de Leon was searching for the fountain of youth, is measured by its fitting to the underlying deeper metaphysical structure (cf.: neither the actual king of France nor the fountain of youth exist in the real world). Both Russell and Meinong stick to the direct correspondence theory of truth, differing just in restriction of possible realms to the actual stuff in the case of the first one. We propose truth as indirect correspondence approach to the matter, and following Terry Horgan, a propositional ersatzist metaphysical interpretation of noneist semantics. Some time ago, myself and Vojko Strahovnik proposed, in a similar direction, to counter the competence based performance error of the Meinongian ultimate ontology engagement into revealing the simple truth that these subsistent and impossible worlds are not the ultimate ontological guys but creatures of language and thought. Meinongians get blocked in their ability to recognize this simple fact by their competence based performance error. Actually we think that their error is a quite a natural fact of life and may get explained by this approach of ours. My lecture will be available on the net in a due time on my homepage, besides to other video lectures stuff already available there. Meinongian scorekeeping paper draft may be found under this link: http://www2.arnes.si/~supmpotr/clanki.html
Photo: Professors Paolo di Lucia, Venanzio Raspa, Giuseppe Lorini, Matjaz Potrc at Universita degli Studi di Milano, law department.